The decision to provide another nuclear power with PALS technology is not unprecedented. The United States has transferred the technology successfully to Britain, France, and even to the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis (Man). Pakistan has made indirect overtures to the United States in what seems to be a bid to obtain the devices, with Pakistani officials making public suggestions to their U.S. counterparts that cooperation of the U.S. with Pakistan on nuclear safety issues is an imperative given their relative inexperience with safety systems and nuclear weapons in general (Man).

In the aftermath of September 11th, the U.S. began seriously mulling the option of providing some sort of technical assistance to install PALS on Pakistans weapons (LaMontagne). Momentum for this proposal increased as several incidents highlighted the dominance of Pakistans nuclear program by Taliban supporters. Two Pakistani nuclear scientists were detained by Pakistans military after being discovered in extensive contact with the Taliban government (Barry). In October of 2001, the Bush administration invited Pakistani officials to tour U.S. nuclear installations and made public statements through several officials supporting the idea of technical assistance to Pakistan to secure their weapons (Wagner). While U.S. policymakers were considering the option, the Indian parliament was attacked and the idea seems to have been shelved while the U.S. engaged in frantic negotiations between India and Pakistan.

The primary reason to provide PALS is simply because of the multitude of dangers that could threaten the Pakistani arsenal. While each of these possibilities may be remote, even a small risk of a nuclear attack on any country is something that should be avoided if possible. The damage that such an attack would cause is simply too great, and the U.S. should have a response prepared for even the most remote contingencies. The main benefit of PALS is that they give the Pakistani government far greater control of their arsenal in any of these scenarios. A 12 digit code would be virtually impossible to decrypt without setting off one of the charges on the PAL, and even if the codes were compromised somehow, the government would retain the option of remotely disabling the weapons (Bellovin). The cost of installing these devices on thirty or so weapons would be minimal as well at most the project would cost several million dollars, which is an excellent deal when compared to the billions spent disrupting terrorism in Afghanistan (Bellovin). As long as the program is tailored to avoid some of the pitfalls that opponents fear, the costs of implementing it will pale in comparison to the potential rewards.